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Intervening in the Case (or Controversy): Article III 
Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the 
Federal Courts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court juris-
diction to deciding “cases” and “controversies.”1 Federal courts ensure 
compliance with Article III in part by requiring the plaintiff bringing the 
lawsuit to possess standing.2 Some federal courts of appeal hold that 
when an individual or entity seeks to intervene in an existing case under 
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the potential intervenor 
must also possess Article III standing. Other federal courts of appeal hold 
that potential intervenors need not have standing because the party that 
initiated the lawsuit already satisfied Article III. 
While the courts and the legal scholarship have recognized the split 
in the circuits,3 few conclusions have been reached as to why the circuits 
are split on the issue. The lack of a clear explanation for the divergence 
is not surprising; the standing doctrine is complicated. As the late Har-
vard Law Professor Paul Freund asserted, standing is “among the most 
amorphous [issues] in the entire domain of public law.”4 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has declared that “Art[icle] III . . . ‘standing’ . . . is perhaps 
the most important of [the Article III] doctrines.”5 Applying standing in 
the context of Rule 24 intervention only adds an additional layer of com-
plexity to the analysis. In spite of the fact that standing in the interven-
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 2. Article III imposes other jurisdictional requirements on federal courts, such as the man-
date that every claim be ripe for adjudication. In this Comment, we will address only the standing 
requirement of Article III. 
 3. See Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 178 F.3d 538 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Joshua C. Dickinson, Note, 
Standing Requirements for Intervention and the Doctrine of Legislative Standing: Will the Eighth 
Circuit “Stand” by Its Mistakes in Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. 
Ehlmann?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 983, 992 (1999); Amy M. Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to In-
tervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirements for Rule 24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 
699–700 (2002). 
 4. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 1 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(f)(1) (3d ed. 1999). 
 5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tion context has left many scholars (and, dare we say, courts) puzzled, it 
is an issue of extreme importance that must be resolved. 
In this Comment, we identify why the circuits reach divergent con-
clusions—a reason that legal scholarship has not explicitly recognized. 
We argue that the courts that do not require intervenors to have Article 
III standing view standing as a requirement imposed on all federal 
courts, that is, that at least one party must have standing before the court 
can maintain jurisdiction; conversely, the courts that do require interve-
nors to have Article III standing view standing as a requirement imposed 
on all parties that come before a federal court. Thus, it is a subtle dis-
tinction in analytical approach that divides the circuits on this issue. We 
recognize that viewing standing as a requirement on the court still neces-
sarily depends on a party having standing; however, we argue that the 
court need only ensure that the original party to bring suit has standing—
not that every party before the court has standing. Under this approach, 
by ensuring that at least one of the parties before it has standing, the 
court satisfies its obligation under Article III and may properly take ju-
risdiction. 
In Part II, we trace the origins and development of both Article III 
standing and Rule 24 intervention. In Part III, we analyze the case law of 
the federal circuits to demonstrate that the two groups of circuit courts 
approach standing in fundamentally different ways and thus reach differ-
ent conclusions. In Part IV, we posit that federal courts should view 
standing as a requirement on the court, and we give three principle rea-
sons in support of this assertion. First, while the Supreme Court has not 
yet answered this question, we suggest that the High Court does, in fact, 
approach standing as a requirement on the court. Second, viewing stand-
ing as a requirement on a federal court is consistent with the language 
and purpose of Article III. Finally, viewing standing as a requirement on 
the parties produces results inconsistent with the requirements and poli-
cies of intervention. Because standing is properly viewed as a require-
ment on the court, we conclude that a Rule 24 intervenor need not pos-
sess Article III standing to enter an existing case,6 and we encourage 
 
 6. We note that the question whether an intervenor must possess standing to continue the 
case after the original party, which had standing to bring the suit in the first place, drops out of the 
proceedings is a wholly different question than that which we address in this Comment. The former 
question was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 
(1986). See infra Part IV.A for an in-depth discussion of Diamond. The question we address is 
whether an intervenor must possess standing to enter a case in which the original party that had 
standing to bring the suit remains in the case. 
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courts to hold accordingly.  In Part V, we offer a brief conclusion. 
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND RULE 24 INTERVENTION 
Article III standing and Rule 24 intervention are complex issues by 
themselves: standing is a constitutional doctrine but was created by the 
judiciary; intervention is a rule of court but was created with legislative 
authority; both doctrines contain multiple sub-requirements; and both 
doctrines have changed substantially during their history. In this Part, we 
will trace the development and describe the basic requirements of both 
standing and intervention. 
A. The Constitution and Article III Standing 
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction 
and judicial power of federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controver-
sies.” This restriction ensures that only specific cases invoke the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts so that the federal courts do not engage in answer-
ing abstract questions that are better left to the representative branches of 
government.7 
“Standing is a judicially-developed doctrine designed to ensure an 
Article III court is presented by parties before it with an actual case or 
controversy.”8 The Supreme Court holds that there are three elements to 
standing: (1) there must be an actual or threatened injury; (2) the injury 
must be traceable to the alleged conduct of the other party; and (3) the 
injury must be redressable by a court.9 The injury is most important be-
cause it is part of all three elements of standing. To satisfy the injury re-
quirement “a plaintiff must allege . . . that he has suffered some actual or 
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the de-
fendants.”10 
The “case” or “controversy” requirement, and thus the standing re-
quirement, continues throughout the pendency of the case; therefore, 
federal courts must continue to insist on this requirement in order to 
maintain jurisdiction. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “It is not enough 
that a real controversy existed when the lawsuit was filed, the contro-
 
 7. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
 8. Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 829. 
 9. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
 10. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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versy must be a ‘live’ controversy throughout all stages of the case.”11 In 
other words, at least one party in the case must possess Article III stand-
ing at all times for the federal court’s jurisdiction to continue. 
B. Congress and Rule 24 Intervention 
In the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,12 Congress delegated to the Su-
preme Court the power to prescribe rules of procedure, practice, and evi-
dence for all federal courts.13 The following year, the Supreme Court ap-
pointed an advisory committee to draft the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.14 Today, new rules and amendments to the rules must pass 
through several layers of review and approval to become final. The Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules continually studies the operation of the 
rules, submits proposed changes to the Judicial Conference, and drafts 
explanatory committee notes to the rules.15 The public is given the op-
portunity to review the proposed changes, after which the rules and 
amendments must be approved by the Advisory Committee, the Standing 
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and finally, the Supreme Court.16 
After the Supreme Court approves any amendments, it must send the 
amendments to Congress for review.17 If Congress declines to reject, 
modify, or defer the rules during its review period,18 the rules take effect 
as a matter of law.19 The Advisory Committees are composed of federal 
judges, state chief justices, law professors and lawyers with expertise in 
the relevant area, and representatives of the Department of Justice.20 
Thus, in addition to the fact that all Rules are created by the members of 
the Advisory Committee, the final version of any Rule is explicitly ap-
proved by the Supreme Court and at least implicitly approved by Con-
 
 11. Id. at 1202 (citing Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362–64 (1987)). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071–2077 (1934). 
 13. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Federal Rulemaking: The Rulemaking Process—A Summary 
for the Bench and Bar, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last updated Nov. 8, 
2002). The website www.uscourts.gov is the official website of the U.S. federal court system. 
 14. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 
1658 (1995). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 2072; Mecham, supra note 13. 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 2074; Mecham, supra note 13. 
 18. Congress is given a minimum of seven months to review the amendments. Mecham, su-
pra note 13. 
 19. McCabe, supra note 14, at 1657. 
 20. Id. at 1664–65. 
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gress.21 
Rule 24 was included in the first version of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but it has since been amended six times.22 The most re-
cent amendments that affected subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Rule 
24—the subsections relevant to our analysis—occurred in 1966, when 
the provisions for intervention “as of right” were substantially modified. 
Prior to 1966, intervention as of right was allowed only in very narrow 
circumstances,23 but subsection (a) was modified to make the interest re-
quirement less strict.24 Subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 24 have not been 
changed since the 1966 amendments and read, in pertinent part: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be per-
mitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United 
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an appli-
cant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or 
fact in common. 
Under the language of Rule 24, intervention as of right has three re-
quirements: an interest related to the subject of the action, likelihood that 
the interest be impaired in the intervenor’s absence, and lack of adequate 
representation by the existing parties.  However, courts typically con-
dense those three requirements to two requirements: first, a potential in-
tervenor as of right must claim a sufficient interest in the case,25 and sec-
 
 21. Id. at 1673; Mecham, supra note 13. 
 22. Rule 24 was amended in 1948, 1949, 1963, 1966, 1987, and 1991. 
 23. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133–34 & n.3 
(1967). 
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note (1966) (finding the development of the 
previous version of Rule 24(a) to be “unduly restricted”); Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at 
134 (noting that, with the 1966 amendments to Rule 24, “some elasticity was injected” into the prac-
tice of allowing intervention); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.10 
(1985) (concluding that the “federal courts [that] have broadened the scope of intervention . . . heav-
ily in favor of the applicant . . . are consistent with the thrust of the 1966 amendments”). 
 25. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972). A sufficient interest 
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ond, that interest must not be adequately represented by existing par-
ties.26 Permissive intervention is more straightforward: if the potential 
intervenor’s claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common 
with the main action, the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the 
motion to intervene.27 
While intervention as of right and permissive intervention have dif-
ferent requirements, the analysis of whether standing is required applies 
equally to both types of intervention because if the Constitution requires 
all parties to satisfy Article III, then all intervenors must have standing.28 
With the basic stage set for Article III standing and Rule 24 intervention, 
we will now explore the judicial interpretation of the interplay between 
the two. 
III. STANDING: A REQUIREMENT ON THE COURT OR A REQUIREMENT ON 
THE PARTIES? 
Eight of the federal circuits have considered whether Article III 
standing is required of intervenors, and their holdings are split. This split 
is a result of two different approaches to standing: some courts view 
standing as a requirement on every party that comes before the court 
while other courts view standing as a requirement the court must ensure 
is satisfied by at least one party before it can maintain jurisdiction. The 
literature and the courts themselves have failed to recognize this distinc-
tion of approach. Understanding these fundamentally different ap-
proaches to the issue will ultimately assist in resolving the conflict. This 
Part catalogs the positions of the eight circuits that have decided whether 
standing is required of intervenors. 29 
 
in the case has been interpreted as a “significantly protectable interest.” Donaldson v. United States, 
400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 26. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10 (noting 
that “[a]dequacy of representation is a highly complex variable” and exploring the implications of 
the issue). 
 27. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10. 
 28. See Part IV.C for more discussion of the distinction between intervention as of right and 
permissive intervention. 
 29. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits have reached the issue. The remaining circuits—the First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Federal—
have yet to rule on the matter. Some lower courts in these circuits have produced conflicting results. 
Compare Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 80 F. Supp. 2d 557 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (per-
missive intervention allowed by district court in Fourth Circuit), with West Virginia v. Moore, 902 
F. Supp. 715 (S.D.W.V. 1995) (intervention denied by district court in Fourth Circuit due to lack of 
standing). 
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A. Circuits Viewing Standing As a Requirement  
Imposed on the Court 
Five federal circuits have concluded that a potential intervenor need 
not possess Article III standing to come before a federal court. While 
these five circuits may not explicitly identify standing as a requirement 
on the court or a requirement on every party, the holdings of all five cir-
cuits demonstrate that these courts generally view standing as a require-
ment that every court must ensure is satisfied throughout the case by at 
least one party—not as a requirement that every party must satisfy before 
entering the case. 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit considered whether standing is required of interve-
nors in Ruiz v. Estelle.30 The case involved two Texas legislators who 
attempted to intervene into a pending lawsuit dealing with the condition 
of Texas prisons.31 The legislators argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3), 
which was part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),32 af-
forded them the right to intervene under Rule 24.33 Section 3626 pro-
vides, in relevant part: 
Any State or local official including a legislator or unit of government 
whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for 
the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison facilities, or the 
prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not 
admitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall have 
standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such re-
lief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have the right to in-
tervene in any proceeding relating to such relief.34 
The court found that the legislators were within the purview of the 
PLRA, and thus the legislators were granted “an unconditional right to 
intervene” in the prison conditions case.35 Following this determination, 
the court considered whether the PLRA violated Article III of the Consti-
tution by granting the legislators an unconditional right to intervene 
 
 30. 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 31. Id. at 816. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996). 
 33. Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 818. 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) (emphasis added). 
 35. Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 828. 
BYE-PP3 10/21/2003 9:36:00 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
108 
without standing.36 
In concluding that Article III does not require potential intervenors to 
have standing, the court clearly viewed standing as a requirement im-
posed on the court—not a requirement imposed on the parties.37 After 
surveying the positions of other circuits, the court found that “the Article 
III standing doctrine serves primarily to guarantee the existence of a 
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ appropriate for judicial determination,”38 and 
therefore, “Article III does not require each and every party in a case to 
have such standing.”39 The court reasoned that “[o]nce a valid Article III 
case-or-controversy is present, the court’s jurisdiction vests. The pres-
ence of additional parties, although they could not independently satisfy 
Article III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy jurisdiction already 
established.”40 The court viewed standing as a requirement that the 
court—not all parties—had to satisfy, and once the court had satisfied the 
requirement by ensuring that the original parties possessed standing, po-
tential intervenors could enter the case by simply complying with Rule 
24.41 In other words, a case or controversy had existed at the very least 
since the filing of the original motions.42 Thus, the court found that the 
PLRA did not violate the Constitution.43 
2. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit considered the issue in United States Postal Ser-
vice v. Brennan,44 where the U.S. Postal Service sued to enjoin a couple 
from operating a small mail delivery business in competition with the 
Postal Service.45 A labor union for postal workers, the National Associa-
tion of Letter Carriers (“NALC”), sought to intervene as plaintiffs in the 
case under Rule 24.46 The district court denied NALC’s motion, and the 
 
 36. Id. at 828–33. 
 37. See id. at 828. 
 38. Id. at 832 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)). 
 39. Id. (citing David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, 
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726 (1968)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 833. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 45. Id. at 190. 
 46. Id. 
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union appealed.47 
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision but clarified 
that intervention was denied not because NALC lacked Article III stand-
ing but rather because NALC did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 
24.48 The court viewed standing as a requirement imposed on the court 
that was satisfied before the question of NALC’s intervention even 
arose.49 Thus the court viewed the standing analysis as separate and in-
applicable to the intervention analyses: “The existence of a case or con-
troversy having been established as between the Postal Service and the 
[couple that ran the mail business], there was no need to impose the 
standing requirement upon the proposed intervenor.”50 
3. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the requirements imposed on an interve-
nor in dicta in Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry.51 In Perry, 
multiple members of a trade association brought suit against the State of 
Michigan in an attempt to enjoin the director of the Michigan Depart-
ment of Labor from enforcing Michigan’s laws regulating trade appren-
ticeship programs.52 The Michigan chapter of the National Electrical 
Contractors Association (“NECA”) successfully intervened in the suit.53 
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, 
and the State of Michigan declined to appeal the order.54 In spite of the 
fact that the State did not pursue an appeal, NECA sought to appeal the 
district court’s order on its own.55 The Sixth Circuit found that “[a]n in-
tervenor need not have the same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit 
in order to intervene in an existing district court suit where the plaintiff 
has standing,” but on appeal, an intervenor “must have standing under 
Article III of the Constitution entitling it to have the court decide the 
merits of the dispute.”56 
While the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly identify standing as a re-
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 190–91. 
 49. Id. at 190. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 16 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 52. Id. at 689. 
 53. Id. at 690. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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quirement on the court, it implicitly did so by stating that “standing [is] 
necessary to initiate a lawsuit.”57 Thus the court satisfied Article III by 
ensuring that at least one party had standing to bring the suit, and the 
court need not consider standing when parties seek to intervene into a 
case in which standing has already been satisfied. However, when the 
party with standing drops out of the case, as occurred in Perry, any party 
that seeks to continue the case must satisfy the standing requirements.58 
Because NECA could not satisfy those requirements, the court dismissed 
the appeal.59 
4. The Ninth Circuit 
In Yniguez v. Arizona,60 the Ninth Circuit addressed a fact pattern 
similar to that in Perry. In this case, a state employee sued the governor 
of Arizona in an attempt to invalidate an amendment to the Arizona Con-
stitution that made English the official language of the state.61 The dis-
trict court held that the amendment was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Governor declined to ap-
peal the decision.62 Shortly thereafter, Arizonans for Official English 
(“AOE”) moved to intervene in the case in order to appeal the judg-
ment.63 The district court denied the motion, and AOE appealed.64 
The court cited Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt65 in interpreting 
the intervention rule: “Rule 24(a) . . . require[s] the granting of a motion 
to intervene at the outset of litigation if four criteria are met: (1) timeli-
ness; (2) an interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (3) absent in-
tervention the party’s interest may be practically impaired; (4) other par-
ties inadequately represent the intervenor.”66 The court then made clear 
that a potential intervenor did not need to satisfy any other requirements: 
“In order for an individual to intervene in ongoing litigation between 
 
 57. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 693. 
 60. 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 61. Id. at 729. 
 62. Id. at 730. The Governor’s decision not to appeal was not surprising. Governor Rose 
Mofford publicly opposed the adoption of English as Arizona’s official language in her election 
campaign of 1988. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 66. Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 731 (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 527). 
BYE-PP3 10/21/2003 9:36:00 AM 
nnn] Intervening in the Case (or Controversy) 
 111 
other parties, he need only meet the Sagebrush Rebellion criteria.”67 The 
court indicated that standing was not required for intervention by con-
trasting intervention in “an ongoing litigation between other parties”—
where only the Sagebrush Rebellion requirements need to be met—with 
intervention in a case that was no longer ongoing: “where no party ap-
peals, the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III also qualifies 
an applicant’s right to intervene post-judgment.”68 The court extended 
this reasoning to a logical conclusion: “[A]n interest strong enough to 
permit intervention with parties at the onset of an action under Rule 24(a) 
is not necessarily a sufficient basis for intervention after judgment for the 
purpose of pursuing an appeal which all parties have abandoned.”69 
Thus, while AOE likely could have intervened in the district court case 
without satisfying Article III standing requirements, it was not permitted 
to appeal the district court’s judgment by itself without possessing Arti-
cle III standing.70 
The Ninth Circuit evidently did not view standing as a doctrine im-
posed on all parties because in Yniguez, the court would not require a po-
tential intervenor to have standing if attempting to intervene into a case 
in which an original party has already satisfied standing.71 Indeed, the 
court’s conclusion that an intervenor attempting to appeal on its own 
must have standing is consistent with the view that standing is a require-
ment imposed on the court. Specifically, the court lost its “case or con-
troversy” when the party with standing declined to appeal.  Therefore, 
the case could not proceed until the intervenor satisfied the standing re-
quirement and restored the “case or controversy.” 
5. The Eleventh Circuit 
In Chiles v. Thornburgh,72 a U.S. senator sued multiple Florida state 
officials challenging as illegal the operation of a detention facility.73 A 
group of detainees attempted to intervene as of right, but the district 
court denied the motion.74 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id at 734. It should be noted that the court found that AOE did have standing to continue 
the case. Id. 
 71. Id. at 731. 
 72. 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 73. Id. at 1200–01. 
 74. Id. 
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court and found that the detainees were entitled to intervene as a matter 
of right.75 In considering the detainees’ motion to intervene, the court 
found that “standing concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
court,” and that “[i]ntervention under Rule 24 presumes that there is a 
justiciable case into which an individual wants to intervene.”76 Thus, the 
court approached standing as a separate requirement from intervention, 
and as such, it saw standing as a requirement the court had to satisfy be-
fore it ever considered the motion to intervene.77 Its conclusion was 
therefore expected: “We therefore hold that a party seeking to intervene 
need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to meeting the re-
quirements of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justiciable case and con-
troversy between the parties already in the lawsuit.”78 
Despite this holding, the Chiles court did find the standing cases 
helpful to the intervention analysis in one aspect: “The focus . . . of a 
Rule 24 inquiry is whether the intervenor has a legally protectable inter-
est in the litigation. It is in this context that the standing cases are rele-
vant, for an intervenor’s interest must be a particularized interest rather 
than a general grievance.”79 Thus, according to the court, the standing 
analysis is relevant to the intervention analysis.80 Whether the Eleventh 
Circuit equates the intervention interest to the standing interest is not 
clear, but there is some indication that the court considers the two inter-
ests to be identical.81 While the court’s usage of the standing analysis to 
define the interest required for intervention is by no means conventional, 
it did not harm the logic of its conclusion that standing is not required of 
intervenors. Even assuming that the Eleventh Circuit effectively requires 
standing of intervenors as of right (by equating the two interests), the 
Chiles court did not require any such interest of permissive intervenors.82 
In considering whether another group of potential intervenors satisfied 
the requirements of Rule 24, the court stated that a party seeking to inter-
 
 75. Id. at 1215. 
 76. Id. at 1212. 
 77. Id. at 1213. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted) (citing Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 
1986)). 
 80. Id. at 1213. 
 81. The Chiles court analogized the interest of the intervening detainees to “prisoners who 
have standing to sue over the conditions of the institution where they are detained.” Id. at 1214. Thus 
the detainees’ interest likely would also satisfy Article III standing. 
 82. Id. 
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vene permissively need only show that his application is timely and that 
his claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common with the 
main action.83 At that point, a district court has discretion to grant or 
deny the motion.84 By not requiring any interest at all of permissive in-
tervenors, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its position that the Constitution 
does not require potential intervenors to have Article III standing.85 
B. Circuits Viewing Standing As a Requirement  
Imposed on All Parties 
In contrast to the five circuits discussed above, three federal circuits 
have concluded that a potential intervenor must have Article III standing 
to enter a case. As we show in this section, these circuits generally view 
standing as a requirement that every party must satisfy throughout the 
case—not as a requirement that the court may satisfy by finding that at 
least one party has standing. 
1. The District of Columbia Circuit 
The District of Columbia Circuit was the first circuit to expressly re-
quire Article III standing of potential intervenors.86 This circuit first sug-
gested that conclusion in Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. 
Kelley,87 where a U.S. senator sought to intervene in two cases dealing 
with the FBI’s surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.88 Facing a 
vote to make Dr. King’s birthday a national holiday, the senator at-
tempted to obtain access to FBI tapes of Dr. King that became sealed 
upon a court order.89 
The D.C. Circuit found that “Rule 24(a)(2) requires [an] intervenor 
to demonstrate . . . a legally protectable [interest].”90 The court then 
stated that “[s]uch a gloss upon [Rule 24] is in any case required by Arti-
cle III of the Constitution.”91 In addition, the court expressed in a foot-
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t. v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994); S. 
Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 87. 747 F.2d 777 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 778. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 779 (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)). 
 91. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)). 
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note that it explicitly found the senator “lacked a protectable interest and 
thus lacked standing.”92 In spite of the court’s apparent finding that the 
senator lacked standing, its holding is arguably narrower. The court’s 
finding that the senator lacked any protectable interest was sufficient to 
deny the motion to intervene, since Rule 24 does require some protect-
able interest.93 Thus the court’s language about standing arguably can be 
viewed as dicta. 
Even though one D.C. Circuit case acknowledged Kelley as holding 
that intervenors must satisfy Article III standing as well as the require-
ments of Rule 24,94 some dispute regarding the circuit’s position on the 
matter later arose and was recognized in Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.95 In Rio Grande, a pipeline 
company sought review of a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) that denied a request by the company to include 
the cost of pipeline in its rate base.96 A third-party pipeline company that 
had received a similar denial attempted to intervene in the suit under 28 
U.S.C. § 2348.97 The lower court denied the motion, and the company 
appealed.98 
In considering whether intervenors require standing, the D.C. Circuit 
found that two lower courts had “produc[ed] precedent that can be read 
as in direct conflict” with each other—one case supporting the imposi-
tion of a standing requirement on intervenors and one case opposing such 
a requirement.99 The court followed Kelley’s holding that intervenors 
must have standing.100 In arriving at that conclusion, the court viewed 
Article III standing as a doctrine applicable to every party coming before 
a federal court rather than to every federal court hearing a case. In Rio 
Grande, the court looked to the rationale underlying the Kelley decision: 
 
 92. Id. at 781 n.3. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t. v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing 
Kelley as support for the proposition that “we have held that because an intervenor participates on 
equal footing with the original parties to a suit, a movant for leave to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) 
must satisfy the same Article III standing requirements as original parties”). 
 95. 178 F.3d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 96. Id. at 535. 
 97. Id. at 537. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 537–38. The two cases are, respectively, City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 17 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 26 F.3d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 100. Rio Grande, 178 F.3d at 538. 
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“[B]ecause a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing 
with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the standing require-
ments imposed on those parties.”101 The court concluded that “[b]ecause 
a prospective § 2348 intervenor similarly seeks to participate like a 
party, . . . it should be treated like a party. Accordingly, as we had held in 
Kelley, it must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on parties.”102 
Thus any notions that the D.C. Circuit might allow intervention without 
standing were dispelled. 
2. The Eighth Circuit 
In the Eighth Circuit case Mausolf v. Babbit,103 multiple snowmobile 
enthusiasts brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior and others to 
enjoin the enforcement of snowmobiling restrictions in Voyageurs Na-
tional Park.104 The Voyageurs Region National Park Association and 
other conservationist groups moved to intervene under Rule 24.105 The 
Park Association sought to secure vigorous enforcement of the restric-
tions on snowmobiling in the Park, and the Eighth Circuit,106 while hold-
ing that the Park Association had standing and satisfied the requirements 
of Rule 24(a), concluded that an intervenor must satisfy Article III stand-
ing.107 
In considering whether the Park Association needed Article III stand-
ing to intervene, the Eighth Circuit first noted that “Rule 24(a) says noth-
ing about standing.”108 The court then surveyed the “diverse, sometimes 
‘anomalous’ approaches”109 taken by the federal courts of appeals and 
concluded that it could not identify a “majority view” on the question.110 
Faced with the Park Association’s argument that Article III only required 
the original parties to have standing, the court nevertheless found that 
Article III required all parties in the case to have standing: “In our view, 
an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack 
standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article III case or contro-
 
 101. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting City of Cleveland, 17 F.3d at 1517). 
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 104. Id. at 1296. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1296–97. 
 107. Id. at 1300. 
 108. Id. at 1299. 
 109. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)). 
 110. Id. at 1299. 
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versy.”111 The court demonstrated that it viewed standing as a require-
ment on the parties, and it stated this view in much more explicit lan-
guage than other circuits that agree: “An Article III case or controversy is 
one where all parties have standing, and a would-be intervenor, because 
he seeks to participate as a party, must have standing as well.”112 
3. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit’s treatment of standing in the intervention con-
text has not been consistent, and questions still remain as to that circuit’s 
position on the issue. In United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land,113 the Sec-
retary of the Interior attempted to acquire property on Lake Michigan in 
a condemnation action.114 A not-for-profit corporation sought to protect 
the property for public use by intervening in the case.115 In affirming the 
district court’s decision to disallow the corporation from intervening, the 
Seventh Circuit did not determine whether the corporation needed stand-
ing to intervene.116 Rather, the court found that “[t]he interest of a pro-
posed intervenor . . . must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy 
the standing requirement.”117 
Based on this standard, a court would not need to determine if an in-
tervenor should comply with Article III standing because any party that 
satisfied the interest requirement of intervention would necessarily sat-
isfy the interest requirement of standing.  Likewise, any party that did not 
satisfy the interest requirement of intervention would be denied interven-
tion, making the question of standing irrelevant. By making compliance 
with the intervention interest more difficult than compliance with the 
standing interest, the 36.96 Acres court effectively rendered moot the 
question of whether standing is required of intervenors. Under the 36.96 
Acres court’s reasoning, the Seventh Circuit would never need to decide 
if standing is required of intervenors.118 
Eleven years after 36.96 Acres, the Seventh Circuit revisited the is-
 
 111. Id. at 1300. 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 114. Id. at 857. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 859. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Alternatively, a court could use the 36.96 Acres decision to avoid deciding whether a 
party had an interest sufficient to intervene. If it concluded that the party did not satisfy Article III 
standing, it would not need to consider the interest required to intervene. 
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sue and decided that all intervenors must satisfy Article III standing.119 
In Solid Waste Agency, several Illinois municipalities brought suit chal-
lenging the denial of a permit to build a landfill near the town of Bartlett, 
Illinois.120 The residents of Bartlett moved to intervene under Rule 24 to 
keep the landfill from being built.121 
In considering whether the Bartlett residents should be allowed to in-
tervene, the court discussed a hypothetical property owner whose prop-
erty right might be destroyed as the result of a lawsuit by an environ-
mental agency.122 The court noted that “[t]he threatened injury would 
give [the property owner] the minimal standing required by Article III, 
which our court requires of any intervenor.”123 In support of its conclu-
sion, the court cited its own 36.96 Acres decision,124 even though that 
case simply stood for the proposition that the intervention interest is 
greater than the standing interest.125 However, the Solid Waste Agency 
court made its assertion clear by stating that “[s]ome other courts do not 
require [Article III standing in the intervention context]”126 and citing 
the Sixth Circuit’s Perry decision, which held that an intervenor need not 
have the same interest necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene 
in a suit where the plaintiff has standing.127 The Solid Waste Agency 
court further bolstered its inclusion of standing in the requirements for 
intervention by reasoning that a “would-be intervenor [should] not be 
permitted to push out the already wide boundaries of Article III stand-
ing.”128 The court denied the Bartlett residents’ motion to intervene as of 
right.129 Regardless of whether it interpreted its earlier 36.96 Acres deci-
sion correctly, the Solid Waste Agency court was clear in declaring that 
the Seventh Circuit requires standing of all intervenors as of right.130 
The Solid Waste Agency court’s treatment of the Bartlett residents’ 
 
 119. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 
F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 120. Id. at 504. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 507. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 125. Id. at 859. 
 126. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507. 
 127. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 128. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507. 
 129. Id. at 509. 
 130. Id. at 507. 
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motion to intervene permissively131 is problematic. The court repri-
manded the district court for denying intervention based on the residents’ 
lack of a sufficient interest because, according to the Seventh Circuit, 
“‘interest’ does not appear in Rule 24(b). All that is required for permis-
sive intervention, so far as bears on this case, is that the applicant have a 
claim or defense in common with a claim or defense in the suit.”132 Be-
cause the district court misapplied the law, the Seventh Circuit remanded 
the case for proper consideration of permissive intervention.133 This part 
of Solid Waste Agency is highly problematic because if the court were 
correct in asserting that Article III applies to all intervenors as of right, 
then Article III must logically also apply to all permissive intervenors.134 
The court’s treatment of permissive intervention seems to indicate that 
when it considered intervention as of right, it meant to conclude, like the 
36.96 Acres court did, that the interest required for intervention as of 
right is simply a greater interest than the interest required for standing.135 
Whatever the intention, the Solid Waste Agency court left the Seventh 
Circuit’s position on standing in the intervention context far from clear. 
The Seventh Circuit declined to untangle the issue four years later in 
Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbit,136 where several American 
Indian tribes attempted to convert a racing track into a casino and gaming 
facility.137 The American Indian tribes’ application was denied, and the 
tribes sought review of the decision.138 Another American Indian tribe, 
the St. Croix Indians, sought to intervene as defendants because the St. 
Croix operated existing gambling facilities in the same area in which the 
other Indian groups wanted to start their casino.139 
In denying the St. Croix’s motion to intervene, the court again con-
sidered standing in the context of intervention.140 The court observed 
that “[f]rom a pragmatic standpoint, . . . ‘[a]ny interest of such magnitude 
[as to support Rule 24(a) intervention as of right] is sufficient to satisfy 
 
 131. Id. at 509. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See discussion infra Part IV.C (reasoning that if the Constitution applies to any interve-
nors, it must apply to all intervenors, whether as of right or permissive). 
 135. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507; see also United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 
F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 136. 214 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 137. Id. at 943. 
 138. Id. at 945. 
 139. Id. at 943. 
 140. Id. at 946. 
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the Article III standing requirement as well.’”141 However, the court 
concluded by dodging the issue: “Because it is enough here to decide 
[that] the St. Croix has [not] satisfied the requirements of the rule, we do 
not explore further what the outer boundaries of standing to intervene 
might be.”142 Thus the Sokaogon court did not determine whether the 
Seventh Circuit requires intervenors to have standing. 
In summary, 36.96 Acres, Solid Waste Agency, and Sokaogon are all 
consistent with the notion that the Seventh Circuit requires intervenors as 
of right to have an interest that is greater than the interest required in the 
standing analysis, but beyond that statement, little is clear. The Seventh 
Circuit must still deal with Solid Waste Agency’s inconsistent assertions 
that standing is required of intervenors as of right and that no interest is 
required of permissive intervenors. 
Whether the Seventh Circuit views standing as a requirement on the 
court or a requirement on the parties is difficult to determine, considering 
the circuit’s complicated analysis of the issue. Because 36.96 Acres and 
Sokaogon simply stated that a potential intervenor’s interest must be 
greater than the standing interest, those courts’ approach to standing is 
inconclusive. Solid Waste Agency’s language offers evidence supporting 
both approaches. In stating that “our court requires [Article III standing] 
of any intervenor,” the court viewed standing as a requirement on the 
parties.143 However, by concluding that permissive intervention does not 
require any interest at all, the court shied away from the view that stand-
ing applied to parties and left open the conclusion that standing was al-
ready satisfied in the case before the permissive intervention. 
IV. STANDING IS PROPERLY VIEWED AS A REQUIREMENT THE COURT 
MUST ENSURE IS SATISFIED 
We argue that standing should be approached as a requirement on 
every federal court—not as a requirement on every party coming before 
a federal court. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s ap-
proach to standing in an intervention context as well as the language and 
purpose of Article III. In addition, viewing standing as a requirement on 
all parties produces results inconsistent with Rule 24 intervention. 
 
 141. Id. (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 
F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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A. Supreme Court Treatment of Standing in the  
Context of Intervention 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether Rule 24 in-
tervenors must possess Article III standing.144 The Court has, however, 
addressed a closely related issue, and in that context, the Court provided 
guidance to the resolution of standing in the framework of intervention. 
Diamond v. Charles145 is the most relevant Supreme Court case re-
garding standing in the intervention context. While the Court did not ad-
dress whether an intervenor must have standing to enter an ongoing case 
at the trial court level, the Court did discuss standing and intervention at 
the appellate level.146 Although Diamond has been read to support either 
conclusion,147 we argue that the proper reading of Diamond indicates 
that standing is a requirement on the court, not on every party. In-depth 
consideration of Diamond is thus appropriate. 
In 1979, the Illinois Legislature amended its abortion law to increase 
state regulations regarding abortions.148 The law imposed criminal liabil-
ity on persons that performed abortions in certain circumstances; in other 
circumstances, the law required physicians to provide women with in-
formation related to abortions.149 Upon passage of the amendments to 
the abortion law, seven physicians and two abortion clinics filed a class 
action suit against the State of Illinois seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of the abortion law.150 Another physician, Eugene F. Diamond, moved to 
intervene in the case as a party defendant based on his “conscientious ob-
jection to abortions” as well as on his “status as a pediatrician and as a 
 
 144. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69, 69 n.21 (1986) (recognizing that “[t]he Courts 
of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of right 
must himself possess standing” but concluding that “[w]e need not decide today whether a party 
seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), 
but also the requirements of Art. III”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 62–71. 
 147. Compare Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507 (acknowledging that Diamond did not 
resolve the conflict, asserting that “there is less to it than meets the eye, since Diamond makes clear 
that a case must be dismissed if the only party on one side of the suit is an intervenor who lacks 
standing,” and concluding that standing is required of all intervenors), with Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 
814, 830–31 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that the Diamond Court’s discussion of the standing 
interest and the intervention interest “created confusion” among the circuits and asserting that Dia-
mond supports a conclusion that standing is not required of intervenors). 
 148. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56. 
 149. Id. at 57 n.3. 
 150. Id. at 57. 
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parent of an unemancipated minor daughter.”151 The district court 
granted Diamond’s motion to intervene.152 
After a series of preliminary injunctions and appeals, the district 
court permanently enjoined the enforcement of several sections of the 
abortion law.153 After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the permanent in-
junction, the State of Illinois chose not to appeal the decision, but Dia-
mond did file a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court.154 The Court 
found that Diamond did not possess Article III standing, and with no 
“case” or “controversy,” the Court dismissed Diamond’s appeal.155 In 
more generic terms, the Supreme Court held that an intervenor that lacks 
standing may not appeal a judgment if no party that possesses standing 
chooses to appeal the decision.156 In so concluding, the Court viewed the 
standing doctrine as a requirement on the court—not as a requirement on 
every party to come before the court. 
The Court first acknowledged that Article III “limits the power of 
federal courts to deciding ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”157 The Court then 
discussed the policy of requiring the complaining party to have suffered 
an injury to prevent federal courts from becoming involved in the “vindi-
cation of value interests” or the resolving of vague concerns.158 Turning 
to the facts of the case, the Court stated, “Had the State of Illinois in-
voked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . and sought review of the 
Court of Appeals’ decision, the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement 
would have been met, for a State has standing to defend the constitution-
ality of its statute.”159 In other words, the Court reasoned that once one 
party possessing standing had appealed, Article III would be satisfied. 
The Court made clear that Article III applies to the court by declaring 
that “[the State of Illinois’s] failure to invoke our jurisdiction leaves the 
Court without a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”160 
The Court went so far as to note that, even though Diamond did not 
have standing, Diamond could have appealed if the State of Illinois had 
 
 151. Id. at 57–58. 
 152. Id. at 58. 
 153. Id. at 59–61. 
 154. Id. at 61. 
 155. Id. at 64. 
 156. Id. at 71. 
 157. Id. at 61. 
 158. Id. at 62 (quoting United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 63–64 (emphasis added). 
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also appealed because Article III would already be satisfied.161 In a tell-
ing passage, the Court hypothesized: 
Had the State sought review, this Court’s [r]ule . . . makes clear that 
Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to 
seek review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave 
to argue orally. But this ability to ride “piggyback” on the State’s un-
doubted standing exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before 
the Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no case 
for Diamond to join.162 
The Court clearly viewed the two analyses—standing analysis and 
intervention analysis—as distinct; if the State had appealed, the Court’s 
Article III standing obligation would have been satisfied, and it could 
have maintained jurisdiction.163 Only after its jurisdiction was certain 
could it properly enter into an analysis of intervention. Therefore if the 
State had appealed, Diamond would have been entitled to remain in the 
proceedings also, even though he clearly lacked standing. Only when 
there is no party before the court that possesses standing is there “no case 
for Diamond to join.”164 In further evidence of the Court’s approach to 
standing as a requirement on a federal court, the Court stated that “Dia-
mond’s status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as of right, 
does not confer standing sufficient to keep the case alive in the absence 
of the State on this appeal.”165 The Court put standing in its proper per-
spective—as a requirement on the court to keep the case alive—not as a 
requirement on every party. 
B. The Policy of Article III Standing 
We do not discount the important purpose of Article III standing, 
which is to ensure that federal courts do not engage in making abstract 
policy decisions. However, the policy behind Article III indicates that 
standing is a requirement on the federal courts—not a requirement on all 
who seek to come before those courts. If, at the outset, a federal court has 
correctly determined that it has an actual concrete “case” or “contro-
versy” before it, the purpose of Article III is not frustrated by allowing 
intervenors to subsequently participate in the proceedings. 
 
 161. Id. at 64. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 62. 
 164. Id. at 64. 
 165. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
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The policy that guided the judiciary in creating the doctrine of Arti-
cle III standing was largely a concern for separation of powers between 
the three branches of government. If the federal courts are not limited to 
hearing only “cases” and “controversies,” then there is no assurance that 
they will not engage in making abstract policy decisions that are better 
left to the representative branches of government. In Frothingham v. 
Mellon,166 an early case dealing with standing, the Supreme Court ex-
plained: 
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the 
legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws, to 
the executive the duty of executing them, and to the judiciary the duty 
of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the 
courts. The general rule is that neither department may invade the prov-
ince of the other and neither may control, direct, or restrain the action 
of the other. . . . We have no power per se to review and annul acts of 
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.167 
The Court further explained that it may only review an act of Con-
gress if there is “some direct injury” to a particular party.168 The injury 
requirement ensures that the court is addressing a specific wrong rather 
than making an abstract policy decision as to whether a law enacted by 
Congress was appropriate. Standing, therefore, is best viewed as a re-
quirement on federal courts to make certain they are acting within their 
separable power.169 
Admittedly, the party bringing the action has the burden of persuad-
ing the federal court that the court has the authority to hear the case. That 
burden, however, does not fall upon all parties. As the Supreme Court in 
Frothingham stated, “The party who invokes the power [(the jurisdiction 
of the court)] must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, 
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some 
 
 166. Frothingham was consolidated with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 167. Id. at 488. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Flast Court expounded on the separa-
tion of powers: 
Embodied in the words “cases” and “controversies” are two complementary but some-
what different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to ques-
tions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned 
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not 
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 
 Id. at 94–95. 
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direct injury as the result of its enforcement . . . .”170 By expressly dis-
tinguishing which party bears the burden, the Court implicitly indicated 
that it is not a burden that all parties coming before it must bear. When 
the party invoking the power of the court satisfies the standing require-
ment, that party has already established the jurisdiction of the court for 
that particular “case” or “controversy.” Once the court’s jurisdiction is 
established, it is difficult to imagine how allowing others to participate in 
the proceedings would change a concrete “case” or “controversy” into an 
abstract policy question that federal courts are forbidden to hear. Even 
with other participants in the proceedings, the court would still only be 
deciding one specific case. 
A comparison of standing to supplemental jurisdiction is particularly 
illustrative of the fact that once Article III is satisfied, a court’s jurisdic-
tion is vested. In a helpful footnote in Ruiz v. Estelle,171 the Fifth Circuit 
observed that in the supplemental jurisdiction context, “the presence of 
additional claims which could not have been filed in federal court does 
not necessarily divest a federal court of jurisdiction so long as the Article 
III requirements remain intact.”172 Similarly, once the court establishes 
jurisdiction through the standing of the original parties, the court can 
hear the intervenor’s case, even though the intervenor lacks standing, “so 
long as the Article III requirements remain intact,” or, in other words, so 
long as the original parties continue in the proceedings or the intervenor 
can meet the standing requirements independently.173 
The policy of Article III standing to ensure that federal courts do not 
overstep their apportioned function indicates that standing is a require-
ment on federal courts and not a requirement on every applicant that 
 
 170. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added); see supra note 166; see also Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) 
(“[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to [show 
standing].”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885) (“[The Supreme Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the 
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to ad-
judge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”). 
 171. 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 172. Id. at 833 n.27 (citations omitted). 
 173. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). Though standing is a requirement on the 
court that is satisfied at the outset of a particular case, it is a requirement that must be maintained 
throughout the proceedings of the case. See, e.g., Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1202 (11th 
Cir. 1989). Hence, if the original parties on which the court relied to satisfy Article III drop out of 
the proceedings, the court will be required to ensure that what is left constitutes a “case” or “contro-
versy” in order to continue the proceedings. In Diamond, the Court was unable to maintain jurisdic-
tion without the original parties that invoked such jurisdiction. 
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seeks to influence the outcome of a particular case. 
C. Viewing Standing As a Requirement on All Parties  
Is Inconsistent with Rule 24 
In this Part, we argue that approaching standing as a requirement on 
all parties produces results inconsistent with the language and purpose of 
Rule 24. We certainly realize that if a requirement is imposed by the 
Constitution, then a Rule of Civil Procedure—or anything else, save a 
constitutional amendment, for that matter—cannot override it. Further-
more, that a constitutional requirement conflicts with the language and 
purpose of a rule only indicates that the rule is out of harmony with the 
intent of the Constitution—not vice versa. We do not suggest here that a 
Rule of Civil Procedure trumps the Constitution; rather, we suggest that 
the process by which rules are created provides evidence of the proper 
interpretation of Article III. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
drafted by the Advisory Committee, which is composed of judges, 
prominent lawyers, and law professors. The Supreme Court approves the 
rules, and Congress is given an opportunity to reject the rules. Thus the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent the view of the Advisory 
Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress. While the rules are 
clearly not an official interpretation of the Constitution, they were not 
drafted nor are they amended on a whim.174 Thus, the conclusion of 
these groups—the rule itself—is at least persuasive evidence as to the 
groups’ likely interpretation of the law. 
The circuits that require standing of intervenors generally reason 
that, as the Eighth Circuit put it, “an Article III case or controversy, once 
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an 
Article III case or controversy.”175 The courts that have required stand-
ing of intervenors typically have done so in the context of Rule 24(a), 
which deals with intervention as of right. However, the logic of that posi-
tion also requires that permissive intervenors under Rule 24(b) possess 
Article III standing. If the Constitution demands standing of all parties 
that come before a federal court, then all intervenors—whether as of 
right or permissive—must possess Article III standing. Adopting the po-
sition that standing applies to both intervenors as of right and permissive 
intervenors, however, necessarily produces three results that are inconsis-
 
 174. See supra Part II.B (reviewing the rigorous amendment process). 
 175. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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tent with Rule 24. First, the requirement in Rule 24(a) that intervenors as 
of right possess an interest in the outcome of the case is rendered mean-
ingless. Second, the requirement in Rule 24(b) that permissive interve-
nors have a claim or defense with a question of law or fact in common 
with the main action is also rendered meaningless. Third, the distinction 
between Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b) becomes practically useless. 
1. Rule 24(a)’s “interest” requirement 
If standing is interpreted as a requirement on all parties, the language 
in Rule 24(a) requiring an interest in the outcome of the action is super-
fluous. If a party has such an interest in the case to satisfy standing, it 
automatically satisfies the intervention interest. This assertion presup-
poses that the standing interest is greater than or equal to the intervention 
interest. Thus, defining the interest levels of Rule 24 and the standing 
doctrine is necessary. 
While the standing interest has been fairly well defined, the interest 
required for intervention could certainly use clarification by the 
courts.176 In short, courts have reached very different conclusions regard-
ing the level of interest required by Rule 24(a). However, all that is nec-
essary for our purposes is that we establish that the standing interest is 
equal to or greater than the intervention interest. First, we note that every 
circuit except one that has considered the level of interest required by in-
tervention has concluded either that the intervention interest is less than 
the standing interest or that the intervention interest and the standing in-
terest are equal. Only the Seventh Circuit has held that the intervention 
interest is a greater interest than the standing interest,177 but that circuit’s 
interpretation is likely improper under dicta in Diamond. In Diamond,178 
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Diamond, the physician who 
supported enforcement of the Illinois abortion law, because he lacked 
standing to continue the case.179 In considering what interest Diamond 
possessed, the Court found that “Diamond’s status as an intervenor be-
low, whether permissive or as of right, does not confer standing suffi-
 
 176. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10. 
 177. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
“[a]ny interest of such magnitude [so as to satisfy Rule 24(a)] is sufficient to satisfy the Article III 
standing requirement as well”); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(same). 
 178. Diamond, 476 U.S. 54. 
 179. Id. at 68. 
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cient to keep the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal.”180 
In other words, even if Diamond had met the requirements to intervene 
as of right, he would not necessarily possess standing. The Court cer-
tainly could have found that an intervenor as of right possesses sufficient 
interest so as to necessarily confer standing, but instead it found that the 
status of an intervenor as of right does not confer standing on the 
party.181 While the Court did not expressly hold that the intervention in-
terest is less than the standing interest, it appeared to view standing as 
more stringent than intervention.182 
Furthermore, even assuming that the Supreme Court had not dis-
cussed the issue in dicta or otherwise, it makes little sense to make the 
intervention interest more stringent than the standing interest because if a 
party has standing, it can bring its own suit. To suggest that with inter-
vention Congress intended to make it more difficult for a party to join a 
case than to initiate its own case wholly ignores not only the language of 
Rule 24(a), but also the Advisory Committee’s notes encouraging courts 
to apply intervention liberally.183 Simply put, viewing standing as a re-
quirement on the parties renders meaningless Rule 24(a)’s requirement 
of an interest in the outcome of the case. 
2. Rule 24(b)’s “question in common” requirement 
If standing is interpreted as a requirement on all parties, the language 
in Rule 24(b) requiring a claim or defense with a question of fact or law 
in common with the main action is rendered even more superfluous than 
the language in Rule 24(a). Under the same reasoning, the interest re-
quired by Rule 24(b) is certainly less than the standing interest. In fact, 
no courts raise the interest for permissive intervention to the level of the 
standing interest based solely on the language of Rule 24(b). Thus, im-
posing standing on potential permissive intervenors as a matter of consti-
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. This conclusion is consonant with the advisory committee’s 1966 amendment to the Rule 
allowing for intervention more liberally. 
 183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note (1966) (finding the development of the 
previous version of Rule 24(a) to be “unduly restricted”); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 (1967) (noting that, with the 1966 amendments to Rule 24, 
“some elasticity was injected” into the practice of allowing intervention); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET 
AL., supra note 24, § 6.10 (concluding that the “federal courts [that] have broadened the scope of 
intervention . . . heavily in favor of the applicant . . . are consistent with the thrust of the 1966 
amendments”). 
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tutional law effectively invalidates the “question in common” language 
of Rule 24(b). 
3. The distinction between the language of Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b) 
Approaching standing as a requirement on all parties virtually nulli-
fies the distinction between subsection (a) and subsection (b) of Rule 24 
as a practical matter. If Rule 24(a)’s protectable interest is less than or 
equal to the standing interest, then Rule 24(b)’s requirement of a claim or 
defense with a question of law or fact in common is certainly less strin-
gent than the standing interest. That Congress employed such different 
language in the two subsections of Rule 24 suggests that different mean-
ings were intended. The two subsections of the rule are parallel in struc-
ture, and the language preceding each of those phrases is virtually identi-
cal. Subsection (a) begins as follows: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating 
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a prac-
tical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that in-
terest . . . .184 
The comparable portion of subsection (b) states: 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an ac-
tion: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common.185 
The emphasized portion of each subsection above demonstrates that 
subsection (a) and subsection (b) are identical—with the exception of the 
words “shall” and “may”—until the point at which they identify what in-
terest is required to intervene. At that point, subsection (a) and subsec-
tion (b) differ dramatically. Such a dramatic change of verbiage in the 
two subsections could not have been coincidental; if the drafters intended 
the interest requirement to be the same in both subsections, they would 
not have used such different language. Thus, the structure of Rule 24 
strongly indicates that the drafters intended a different interest for per-
 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). 
 185. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (emphasis added). 
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missive intervention than for intervention as of right. If standing is re-
quired of all parties, the two interest requirements are equated—they 
both would have to rise to the level of standing. 
In addition to the fact that requiring standing of intervenors nullifies 
the distinction between permissive intervention and intervention as of 
right, requiring standing of intervenors will also greatly narrow the scope 
of applicability of Rule 24(b) and will almost completely eliminate the 
need for Rule 24. If standing is a requirement of both methods of inter-
vention, then an applicant with standing may intervene as of right if the 
parties in court do not adequately represent its interests. Furthermore, an 
applicant with standing that seeks to intervene permissively need not 
show anything; its standing will ensure that it has a question of law or 
fact in common. The applicant may intervene merely if the court grants it 
permission to do so. The consequences of this analysis are as follows: 
first, an applicant without Article III standing will never be permitted to 
intervene in a case; second, applicants with standing are highly unlikely 
to enter the case permissively because intervention as of right only re-
quires an applicant with standing to demonstrate that its interests are not 
adequately represented. This standard is not a high one, and courts infre-
quently deny intervention based on adequate representation. Thus, an ap-
plicant will only be able to intervene permissively when it has standing, 
when its interests are fully represented in court, and when the district 
court judge is nevertheless willing to permit the applicant to enter the 
case. This combination of factors will not occur often, and it is unlikely 
that the Rule 24 drafters intended this result in including the possibility 
of permissive intervention. 
Interpreting standing as a requirement on the parties is not consistent 
with the language and policy of Rule 24 intervention, but again, we read-
ily acknowledge that this fact does not foreclose the issue. We argue, 
however, that the illogical result of that approach is at least persuasive 
evidence that the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress 
enacted Rule 24 with the understanding that potential intervenors would 
not need to possess Article III standing.186 This evidence, coupled with 
the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in Diamond and the purpose 
of Article III, indicates that standing should be viewed as a requirement 
on the court—not a requirement on the parties. 
 
 186. Accordingly, we predict that when the U.S. Supreme Court addresses this issue, it will 
hold that Rule 24 intervenors need not possess Article III standing to enter an existing case. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Eight circuits are split on whether an intervenor must have standing 
before it enters an existing case; we have shown that this split is the re-
sult of fundamentally different approaches to the standing doctrine. By 
requiring that at least one party in the case possess standing, federal 
courts ensure that they only hear “cases” and “controversies.”187 Thus, 
standing should be approached as a requirement that every federal court 
must ensure is satisfied at all times during a case—not as a requirement 
that every party must satisfy before it enters the case. Viewing standing 
in this manner is not only consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach 
to standing but is also supported by the language and policies of Article 
III and Rule 24.188 We encourage all federal courts to approach standing 
as a requirement on every federal court and hold that Rule 24 intervenors 
need not possess Article III standing to enter an existing case. 
Tyler R. Stradling & Doyle S. Byers 
 
 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 188. It has been suggested that Rule 24 should be amended to clarify whether or not standing 
applies to intervenors. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 699–700 (concluding that ideally, the advisory 
committee would amend Rule 24 to clarify the issue). However, we conclude that the advisory 
committee need not—and indeed should not—enact such an amendment. Congress is ultimately re-
sponsible for the language of Rule 24, and it is not the role of Congress to declare that the Constitu-
tion does not apply to a particular statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
The Eighth Circuit recognized this principle in Mausolf v. Babbitt: “Congress could no more use 
Rule 24 to abrogate the Article III standing requirements than it could expand the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction by statute.” 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). If Congress determined that 
intervenors should have standing to enter a case, it would be proper for Congress to amend Rule 24 
to require such an interest of intervenors. Such an amendment would not be a declaration of constitu-
tional law but rather a decision of legislative policy. 
